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Abstract 
Visual mental imagery is a process that draws on different cognitive abilities and is 
affected by the contents of mental images. Several studies have demonstrated that 
different brain areas subtend the mental imagery of navigational and non-navigational 
contents. Here, we set out to determine whether there are distinct representations for 
navigational and geographical images. Specifically, we used a Spatial Compatibility 
task (SCT) to assess the mental representation of a familiar navigational space (the 
campus), a familiar geographical space (the map of Italy) and familiar objects (the 
clock). Twenty-one participants judged whether the vertical or the horizontal 
arrangement of items was correct. We found that distinct representational strategies 
were preferred to solve different categories on the SCT, namely, the horizontal 
perspective for the campus and the vertical perspective for the clock and the map of 
Italy. Furthermore, we found significant effects due to individual differences in the 
vividness of mental images and in preferences for verbal versus visual strategies, 
which selectively affect the contents of mental images. Our results suggest that 
imagining a familiar navigational space is somewhat different from imagining a 
familiar geographical space.   
Introduction 
Visual mental imagery arises when perceptual information is accessed from memory, 
giving rise to the experience of “seeing with the mind’s eye” [1,2].  
This cognitive process draws on many abilities, which rely on different cerebral 
structures [3] depending on the contents of the image. For example, imagining a face, 
an object or a place produces activation in different brain areas [4,5,6].  
When people have to arrange the parts of a mental image [7,8], they process them 
using categorical and/or coordinate strategies. In categorical processing judgements 
have to be made about the relative position of the components of a visual stimulus, 
and in coordinate processing absolute distances have to be calibrated between the 
components of a visual stimulus [9]. Palermo et al [10] found that people rely 
exclusively on categorical processing to generate mental images of common objects, 
but require both coordinate and categorical processing to generate mental images of 
landmarks. Furthermore, individuals can be classified as visualizers or verbalizers 
according to whether they rely on imagery when performing cognitive tasks or on 
verbal-analytical strategies, respectively [11]. Visualizers mainly process images 
using coordinate strategies, whereas verbalizers mainly adopt categorical strategies 
when they have to analyse parts of a mental image [12]. 
Representational neglect [13], a syndrome which affects the mental representation of 
space following a cerebral lesion, can selectively affect different imagery domains, 
that is, patients can show deficits in imagining environments and/or objects [14,15]. 
Guariglia and Pizzamiglio [16,17] proposed the existence of two different types of 
mental representations of space: “topological” (navigational) and “non-topological” 
(non-navigational) images. The first are defined as mental representations of stimuli 
in which it is possible to navigate, and the latter as representations of objects or visuo-
spatial displays in non-navigational space (i.e., whether or not I can navigate in the 
space, regardless of its distance). A second reading of cases with representational 
neglect and a recent group study [15] support this distinction. Ortigue and co-workers 
[18] reported the case of a patient with representational neglect that selectively 
compromised the far space of a mental representation. When asked to imagine her 
near space, the patient made no detectable omissions on the contralesional side of the 
mental image. By contrast, when asked to bring back memories of a familiar square in 
Geneva and of the map of France she “forgot” elements that fell on the left side of the 
mental representation. Grossi and co-workers [19] described another patient who 
failed when he had to mentally compare two different times on two analogue clocks 
to decide which clock hands formed the widest angle; thus, he showed a deficit in the 
mental representation of an object.  
It has, however, been highlighted that both navigational and non-navigational mental 
images can be defined according to viewer-centred and object-centred coordinates 
[20]. Viewer-centred coordinates involve the ability to locate objects with reference to 
one’s own body, whereas object-centred coordinates determine where something lies 
in the world regardless of one’s position. It can be hypothesized that topological 
mental images about navigational space rely mainly on a viewer-centred coordinates, 
whereas mental images of non-navigational objects rely mainly on object-centred 
coordinates. Indeed, people navigate through the processing of spatial relations 
among objects by linking them to their own position, thus adopting a viewer-centred 
perspective. Depending on task requirements, however familiar places might also be 
represented through an object-centred coordinates. For instance, if an examiner asks a 
subject to mentally represent the distance between two landmarks, the viewer-centred 
perspective is not required, even though the individual has already directly 
experienced the environment in a viewer-centred perspective to make such an 
estimation. Furthermore, to know what time it is, subjects process the spatial relations 
between objects using the spatial relations between the hands of the clock, thus 
adopting an object-centred perspective. Representing the map of one’s own country is 
more similar to object representation, as it is also based on an object-centred 
perspective. This issue raises some concerns, especially regarding the use of 
geographical space to assess representational neglect, because geographical and 
proper navigational space may tap into different mental representation processes. 
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to establish whether object-centred or viewer-centred 
coordinate systems make the difference in mentally representing navigational and 
non-navigational images. This is especially true in the case of geographical maps, 
which also provide navigational information. Moreover Ortigue and co-workers [18] 
described a patient who showed a clear deficit in representing both a familiar square 
in Geneva and the map of France. This suggests that there is a relationship between 
mental images of geographical and navigational spaces. Differently, Rode and co-
workers [21] reported a case in which geographical information had to be spatialised 
to be neglected. In their study, evocation strategies appeared very different when 
distances between successively named towns were considered. When the task was to 
form a visual image of the map, the patient’s performance was severely impaired; by 
contrast, the patient performed without hesitation when he had to list the names of 
towns in France without imagining placing them on the map.  
A study aimed at investigating which strategies healthy participants use in 
representing different navigational and non-navigational mental images might be 
useful to better understand the mechanisms underlying the mental representation of 
space and objects. Furthermore, in light of the disagreement in the current literature 
over the frequency of representational neglect, with some studies reporting that 
neglect confined to visual mental imagery is a rare occurrence [22,23] and others 
reporting higher frequencies for it [15], it might be useful to understand whether its 
presence was underestimated due to a bias in the tasks used for assessment. 
Bartolomeo et al [23] hypothesized that a task-dependent bias was present in the 
“memory after description” condition proposed by Denis et al [24]. In this condition 
the authors presented patients’ visual layouts or verbal descriptions of layouts and 
then asked them to recall the material. Indeed, in this task healthy participants also 
showed a tendency to report fewer items on the left than on the right. 
As different mental imagery domains exist [16,17], neuropsychological evaluation of 
representational neglect might fail to find representational deficits because it was not 
directly assessed. We aimed to determine whether distinct domains exist for different 
mental images, especially due to the possibility to navigate across them. Other then 
comparing clearly navigational and non-navigational mental images, we tested for the 
first time the hypothesis that the mental image of geographical space, which conveys 
navigational information but cannot be properly navigated, is represented similarly to 
the mental image used in representing a familiar object. Specifically, we investigated 
whether processing a navigational mental image of a geographical space (i.e. the map 
of Italy) corresponds to processing a non-navigational mental image (i.e. the clock) or 
a navigational mental image (i.e. the campus). Results should be interesting because 
of the differences reported in neuropsychological case reports and the frequency of 
representational neglect. For this purpose we developed three different conditions in 
which we compared navigational vs. non-navigational images using well-defined and 
comparable tasks. Furthermore, we assessed the presence of individual differences in 
using strategies to arrange the parts of different mental images. In light of previous 
findings [10] it is important to better understand whether individual predispositions to 
use categorical or coordinate spatial relations affect mental imagery domains 
differently. 
Material and method 
Participants 
Twenty-one healthy right-handed students at the Sapienza University of Rome, very 
familiar with the campus (i.e. for at least three years)(mean age 27.33±3.97; 12 
females) without neurological or psychiatric disorders, participated in the study. Their 
campus knowledge was assessed by a preliminary questionnaire in which they were 
asked to locate the campus landmarks on a map (mean landmark knowledge of the 
university campus 81.27%±14.99%). We also assessed participants’ geographical 
knowledge with a preliminary questionnaire in which they had to select the 
geographical area (i.e. northwest, northeast, southwest or southeast) of a set of 16 
Italian cities (mean knowledge about Italian cities 85.71%±16.55%). Geographical 
knowledge did not differ from knowledge of the campus (t=1.33;p=n.s.). All 
participants gave their written informed consent. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee of IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia of Rome, in agreement with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. 
Stimuli  
To investigate whether different domains of visual-mental imagery exist, we built set 
of stimuli following three main dimensions: images of a familiar environment (the 
campus); images of a familiar object (a clock); and geographical images to 
investigate how a familiar geographical space is processed (a map of 
Italy)(Figure1A). For the familiar environment images we made a set of 120 stimuli, 
which included 15 campus landmarks. For the familiar object image, we collected a 
set of 120 stimuli by using them 12 times (i.e. 01:00; 02:00; 03:00 etc.). Finally, for 
the familiar geographical images we collected a set of 120 stimuli by using 16 Italian 
cities. Within each category, stimuli consisted of two words or times (e.g., Geology–
Chemistry; 01:00–06:00; Trieste–Salerno) indicating two items from the same 
category, which could be displayed horizontally (50%) or vertically (50%)(Figure 1B) 
and represented the correct or incorrect spatial position of the items in real space 
(50% correct).  
---Insert figure 1 here--- 
Procedure 
Participants performed a Spatial Compatibility Task (SCT). SCT requires making a 
decision about the spatial position of the stimulus items, which are presented 
vertically or horizontally. Each stimulus represented either the correct or the incorrect 
spatial position of the two items relative to their current spatial location on the map of 
Italy, the campus or the clock face (Figure1B). Participants had to indicate whether 
the spatial location of the two items was correct or incorrect by mentally recalling 
their spatial representation and pressing one of two buttons on a keypad with their 
right index and middle finger. In the case of the campus, we asked participants to 
imagine themselves standing in front of the statue of Minerva, which is located at the 
centre of the campus. Stimuli were presented in a randomized sequence. Each 
stimulus remained on the screen for 3000 msec and was followed by an inter-trial 
interval of 500 msec, during which a fixation point appeared (Figure1B). For each 
category (i.e., the campus, Italy and the clock) and orientation (i.e., horizontal or 
vertical) we computed accuracy and response time (RT). The experiment was 
implemented in Matlab, using Cogent 2000. 
Each participant completed also a Vividness Task (VT;[25]) and the Verbalizer-
Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ;[11]). The VT tests the vividness of mental images by 
asking participants to imagine a common object. The VVQ investigates consistencies 
and preferences in processing visual versus verbal information and classifies 
individuals as either Visualizers (also called Imagers), who rely primarily on imagery 
when performing cognitive tasks, or Verbalizers, who rely primarily on verbal-
analytical strategies.  
Statistical analysis 
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS. We performed two repeated measures 
ANOVAs to test for significant effects of category (i.e., the campus, Italy and the 
clock) and orientation (horizontal and vertical) and a possible interaction effect 
between the two factors. 
Then we performed two factorial ANOVAs to test the effect of the vividness of 
mental images on accuracy and RTs across different categories and orientations. We 
calculated the median of the participants’ scores on the VT and divided our sample 
into two groups: good (above median) and poor imagers (below median).  
The last two factorial ANOVAs were aimed at testing the effect of preferences in 
processing visual versus verbal information on accuracy and RTs across different 
categories and orientations. We calculated the median of the participants’ scores on 
the VVQ and divided them into Visualizers (above median) and Verbalizers (below 
median). 
Finally, we performed a linear regression analysis on the accuracy in different 
categories to determine whether accuracy on the campus or the clock significantly 
predicted accuracy on Italy. We also performed three multiple regression analyses 
using distances between items (campus: distances were expressed in metres; Italy: 
distances were expressed in kilometres; clock: distances were expressed as discrete 
positions of hours) as predictors and RTs as dependent variable. 
Results 
---Insert figure 2 here--- 
We observed significant differences in participants’ accuracy due to a main effect of 
category (F2,40=6.59;p=0.003) and orientation (F1,20=10.61;p=0.004), but also due to 
an interaction between the two (F2,40=19.79;p=0.000)(Figure2A). A Duncan’s post 
hoc analysis showed that mean accuracy was higher on Italy (mean=51.29±7.73) than 
on the campus (mean=47.36±7.19) and the clock (mean=45.79±9.79)(p<0.05). 
Participants’ accuracy was higher in the vertical (mean=49.54±8.29) than in the 
horizontal (mean=46.75±8.68) orientation. The interaction effect suggests that the 
effect of orientation was not the same in the three categories. In fact, Duncan’s post-
hoc analysis showed a different pattern of accuracy for horizontal and vertical 
orientations across categories (Figure2A). Regarding the campus, participants were 
more accurate on the horizontal than the vertical orientation. The pattern of accuracy 
on Italy and the clock was the same, and opposite to that of the campus. For both Italy 
and the clock, participants were more accurate on the vertical than the horizontal 
orientation. 
Similar to the previous ANOVA, the one on participants’ RTs showed a significant 
main effect of category (F2,40=11.73;p=0.000), orientation (F1,20=35.49;p=0.000), and 
an interaction effect between category and orientation 
(F2,40=19.19;p=0.000)(Figure2B).Duncan’s post-hoc analysis showed that mean RTs 
on Italy (mean=2755.42±430.67) were faster than those on the other categories 
(campus mean=3033.71±337.89; clock mean=3021.32±455.24)(p<0.05). Participants’ 
RTs were faster on the vertical (mean=2854.65±406.46) than on the horizontal 
orientation (mean=3018.98±435.62). In any case, as mentioned above, the interaction 
effect suggests that the effect of orientation was different in the three categories. 
Duncan’s post hoc analysis showed that, although there was no difference between 
RTs on the vertical and horizontal level of the campus category, participants’ RTs on 
Italy and the clock categories were faster for the vertical than the horizontal 
orientation (Figure2B). 
When we tested the effect of the vividness of mental images on accuracy and RTs, we 
found an interaction between vividness and orientation on participants’ accuracy 
(F2,18=5.16;p=0.02)(Figure2C). Duncan’s post hoc analysis showed that good and 
poor imagers differed in processing the vertical orientation of the campus items 
(p<0.01): good imagers performed better than poor imagers (Figure2C). No effect of 
vividness was found in RTs. 
Then we tested the effect of preferences in processing visual versus verbal 
information on accuracy and RTs. Also in this case, we found an interaction effect 
between preferences in processing visual versus verbal information and orientation on 
participants’ accuracy (F1,19=4.61;p=0.05)(Figure2D). Duncan’s Test showed that 
visualizers and verbalizers differed in processing the horizontal orientation of Italy 
and the clock (p<0.01): verbalizers performed better than visualizers (Figure2D). No 
effect of preference in processing visual versus verbal information was found in RTs. 
A linear regression analysis showed that participants’ accuracy on the clock (unlike 
the campus) significantly predicted their accuracy on Italy 
(Beta=0.72;T=4.11;p=0.00), with a positive correlation (r=0.74).  
Finally, distance between items significantly predicted RTs on Italy and the clock 
(Italy Beta=-0.06;T=-2.90;p=0.00; clock Beta=-0.08;T=-4.16;p=0.00), with a negative 
correlation in both conditions (Italy r=-0.21 and clock r=-0.76). 
Discussion 
Our results confirm that different representations subtend the mental imagery of 
navigational and non-navigational contents. This suggests that imagining a familiar 
navigational space is somewhat different from imagining a familiar geographical 
space. Rather than indicating a difference across categories, our results suggest that 
different representational strategies exist within each category. Indeed, we found that 
to solve the SCT a particular orientation seemed to be preferred in each category: a 
horizontal perspective for the campus and a vertical one for the clock and Italy. This 
could be because a clear preference for the vertical orientation was shown for the Italy 
and the clock as both of them were learned with a marked north-south/above-below 
orientation. The data also suggest that these classes of mental images are 
preferentially processed with an object-centred perspective (i.e., Northern Italy or 
Above on the clock face). Otherwise, horizontal orientation seems to be preferred in 
representing a familiar navigational space. This could be because the campus is 
mainly represented by a viewer-centred perspective, which facilitates seeing what is 
in front of the imagers. Further, an alignment effect could explain this result. This 
effect is a facilitation in judging relative locations when participants are aligned with 
respect to the environment than when they are contra-aligned (rotated by 180°), 
because this judgment is more cognitively demanding [26]. The difference we found 
in vertical and horizontal orientation of the campus could be due to this effect, as 
participants were required to imagine themselves in a specific orientation. 
Furthermore, individual differences in the vividness of the mental images selectively 
affected one of the three contents of the mental images, that is, the navigational space. 
We found that good imagers were more able to solve the SCT with the vertical 
orientation of a familiar navigational space than poor imagers; this roughly 
corresponds to imaging what is beyond and behind their visualization with respect to 
their position. Good imagers are probably also more able to access and retrieve a 
survey representation of a familiar navigational space than poor imagers [27,28,29]. 
However, the size of the high and low imagers’ groups was too small to allow 
drawing definitive conclusions about the differences observed in solving the SCT. 
Individual preference in processing visual versus verbal information selectively 
affected the non-navigational mental images of familiar objects (the clock) and 
geographical images (the map of Italy). Indeed, we found that when verbalizers 
performed the cognitive tasks they were more able to solve the horizontal perspective 
of the SCT on the clock and Italy than visualizers. The horizontal perspective is 
unusual for both Italy and the clock, because they are usually represented vertically. 
In both of these cases, verbalizers can take advantage of a verbal-analytical strategy to 
perform the SCT in the unusual horizontal perspective of Italy and the clock. On the 
other hand, visualizers who primarily relied on imagery found no advantage in 
retrieving the usual vertical perspective of these contents. Other explanations can be 
provided by referring to the evidence that categorical and/or coordinate spatial 
relations can be used to arrange the parts of a mental image [7,8]. As stated above, 
people rely exclusively on categorical processing to generate a mental image of a 
common object, but require both coordinate and categorical spatial relations 
processing to generate a mental image of a building [10]. This could be in line with 
our results, which suggest that Italy and the clock were mainly processed as common 
objects (by categorical strategies) and that the campus was processed as a familiar 
navigational object (by coordinate strategies). Considering the importance of category 
formation in many aspects of language, if verbalizers perform the horizontal 
perspective of the clock and Italy better, it can be assumed that the mental images of 
the clock and Italy, like other objects, are mainly generated according to the 
categorical spatial relations between items.  
Both the differences in the orientation of representations of the campus, Italy and the 
clock and the specific effects of individual differences on imagery abilities suggest 
that images of navigational and geographical spaces are somewhat different. We 
found that the pattern of accuracy for mental images of the Italy is quite similar to that 
of the clock and different from that of the campus. Finally, the distance between items 
significantly predicted RTs on Italy and the clock but not on the campus, with shorter 
distances associated with slower RTs and vice versa. This trend suggests that for both 
Italy and the clock, the SCT is more difficult for short than for long distances. Thus, 
we can assume that the mental images of the clock and Italy, which were retrieved to 
solve the SCT, are similar. 
The finding that mental images of a familiar geographical space are processed 
similarly to that of a familiar object raises some question about the use of 
geographical images to assess representational neglect. Recently, Guariglia and co-
workers [15] provided evidence that representational neglect is more frequent than 
previously reported [22,23]. These differences are probably due to a task-dependent 
bias [23,24,30] in detecting it. Moreover, if a patient suffers from a selective deficit in 
representing navigational space that seems more diffuse than the other type[15], this 
deficit will be undetected if assessed by the map or the clock tasks, because the 
representation of navigational space differed from that of geographical space and non-
navigational objects. 
Overall our results suggest that direct experience of the environment compared with 
the acquisition of abstract geographical information could affect the strategies we use 
to mentally represent the space around us. These results support the distinction made 
by Guariglia and Pizzamiglio [16,17] between two different types of mental 
representations of space and shed more light on the mental representation of 
geographical space, which is often used to assess the presence of representational 
neglect. At the same time, they suggest the need for further investigations. First, the 
hypothesis should be tested that good imagers are more able than poor imagers to 
solve the vertical perspective on the campus because they are facilitated in retrieving 
a map-like representation of space. Second, the contingent dissociations between 
navigational and geographical images in patients with representational neglect should 
be investigated. Third, neuroimaging techniques should be used to discover the 
distinct neural circuits of geographical and navigational images. 
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Figure captions 
Fig. 1 Stimuli and task. A. Mental image contents required during the SCT: from left 
to right, Italy, campus and clock. B. Experimental stimuli and timeline. 
Fig. 2 Effect of category and orientation. A. Mean accuracy. B. Mean response time 
(RT). C. Mean accuracy according to individual differences in vividness of mental 
images. D. Mean accuracy according to individual preferences in processing visual 
versus verbal information (Vs=Visualizers;Vb=Verbalizers). 
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